Alabama
Surrogacy Law
There is
no provision on surrogacy in Alabama state law, but it appears to be
permitted.
Summary:
Alabama law does not directly address surrogacy, but at least one court
has acknowledged the parental rights of non-biological participants in
a surrogacy arrangement.
Detail:There is no
statutory provision in Alabama law specifically addressing the validity
of surrogacy arrangements.
However, statutes dealing with placing children for adoption and
baby-buying specifically indicate that they do not apply to surrogate
motherhood.
The case law has not
specifically dealt with the
validity of surrogacy agreements. It would seem, however, that courts
will consider a participant in a surrogacy agreement with no biological
relationship to the child as a parent in contemplating the best
interests of the child.
One 1996 case arose in the context of a divorce proceeding
between a husband and wife who had been part of a traditional surrogacy
(in which the surrogate mother is the biological
contributor of the egg).
The trial court awarded custody to the wife even though she was
biologically unrelated to the child. The husband challenged the
decision on the ground that he was the child's only biological parent.
The court, however, rejected his request and permitted the child to
remain with the wife on the basis of the child s best interest.
Although the validity of the surrogacy contract was not
addressed, the court did consider the non-biological mother a legal
parent.
There is
no provision on surrogacy in Alaska state law.
Summary: The legal
status of surrogacy agreements in Alaska
is unclear. State law is silent regarding surrogacy and only one
reported case of limited importance has touched on the issue.
Detail: The only case
dealing with surrogacy in the Alaska
courts appears to treat surrogacy as a type of adoption. In one 1989
custody case, the plaintiff was a Chickasaw woman who orally agreed to
be inseminated by sperm from her sister’s husband to bear a
child for
them and then signed legal adoption papers upon relinquishing custody.
She sought to have the adoption invalidated on the basis that it had
not been carried out in accordance with a relevant federal statute
(related to Indian governance). The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected
her petition, finding that the state adoption law’s one-year
statute of
limitations had passed.
Arizona
Surrogacy Law
Arizona
law is unclear on the issue of surrogacy agreements.
Summary:
The legal status of surrogacy agreements in Arizona is unclear. While
Arizona law prohibits both traditional (in which the surrogate
mother is the biological contributor of the egg) and
gestational (in which the surrogate mother is not
the biological contributor of the egg) surrogacy agreements, part of
that statute has been ruled unconstitutional by an appellate court.
Detail: Arizona
statute forbids “surrogate parent contracts.”
However, should a surrogacy occur, the law states that the surrogate is
the legal mother of the child she carries and, if she is married, there
is a rebuttable presumption that her husband is the child’s
father. The automatic determination of surrogate as legal mother was
ruled unconstitutional by an Arizona appeals court.
The case law calls into question
the validity of the prohibition of surrogacy arrangements.
However, because the appellate court opinion may only have struck down
one provision of the surrogacy law, and because the
Arizona Supreme Court chose not to review the case, the precise scope
of the prohibition is unclear. In one case in 1994, a husband and wife
entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement. Eggs from the wife were
removed, fertilized with the husband’s sperm and implanted in
the gestational surrogate, who became pregnant with triplets. During
the course of the surrogate’s pregnancy, the wife filed for
divorce and sought custody of the unborn children. The husband argued
that he was the biological father of the children and, pursuant to
statute, the surrogate was the biological mother, leaving the wife no
standing to seek custody. The trial court found the section of
statutory prohibition
on surrogacy agreements which automatically conferred status as legal
mother to the surrogate unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals,
Division One upheld the trial court’s conclusion, finding
that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by granting the intended father an opportunity to establish
paternity but denying the same chance to the intended mother. Thus, at
least in the counties within the jurisdiction of Appellate Division One
(Apache, Coconino, La Paz, Maricopa, Mohave, Navajo, Yavapai and Yuma)
a purported mother is entitled to rebut the presumption that the
surrogate is the legal mother of the child born of the surrogacy
arrangement.
There is
no provision on surrogacy in California state law, but it appears to be
permitted.
Summary: While
California has no law regarding surrogacy, courts have consistently
upheld both traditional (in which the surrogate mother
is the biological contributor of the egg) and gestational (in which the
surrogate mother is not the biological contributor of the egg) surrogacy
arrangements.
Detail: There is no
provision in California law on the subject of surrogacy. Courts have
looked to the Uniform Parentage Act to interpret several cases
concerning surrogacy arrangements. California
courts have consistently upheld the intended parents’ rights
and obligations to their parenthood, whether through a traditional or
gestational surrogacy. However some case law indicates that for a woman
to even be considered in a parentage dispute, she may have to have
either a genetic or gestational relationship to the child.
The most recent California
surrogacy case, in 2003, has numerous complications that make it
irrelevant to individuals seeking guidance in surrogacy agreements (the
dispute concerned a fertility clinic’s negligence). However,
the court’s language seems to reinforce the Moschetta case
over the Buzzanca case in its rigid application of the California
Family Code’s genetic or gestational parentage requirement.
In one 2000 case, the Court of Appeal held that the “intended
parents” reasoning from prior cases applied in the context of
a different-sex domestic partnership. The Court upheld the male
partner’s ability to sue for paternal rights under an
artificial insemination agreement with his female partner. The
insemination procedure used an anonymous donor and thus the male
partner had no genetic relation to the child. One case in 1998
addressed the issue of surrogacy agreements in which the surrogate
mother gestates her own ovum fertilized by sperm from an
anonymous donor. Neither of the intended parents had a genetic link to
the child. The intended/contracting mother sought to be declared the
legal mother of the child, and the intended/contracting father sought
to be declared unrelated to it (the surrogate mother
was not involved). The court found that, in light of the lack of state
law on point and of the state interest in establishing parentage, it
should view both parents’ rights and responsibilities under
the most closely related state statute, which it determined to be the
law governing infertile fathers consenting to their wives’
artificial insemination by an anonymous donor.
That statute (Family Code
§ 7613) says that if a man enters into such an agreement, he
is the legal father, despite the lack of genetic relation. Analogously,
the court held that when a married couple uses a non-genetically
related embryo and sperm implanted into a surrogate, intending to
procreate, they are the lawful parents of the child. In one 1996
divorce case, the husband disputed the family court’s
jurisdiction to award temporary support because the child was the
product of gestational surrogacy and was not genetically related to him
or his wife. (In this case, an anonymous donor egg and sperm were
implanted in the womb of a gestational surrogate, with the intent that
the child of the surrogacy be that of the husband and wife.) The
husband had signed a surrogacy agreement which named him as the
intended father. The Court held that the father’s signing of
the surrogacy agreement was enough to grant jurisdiction to the family
court to order temporary support while parenthood is determined.
In one case in 1994, the court
refused to recognize a surrogacy agreement from which the surrogate
mother
wished to withdraw because of the intended parents’ marital
instability. The surrogacy agreement could not be considered a valid
adoption because it was not consecrated in the presence of a social
worker as required by California law. Furthermore, enforcing it as a
surrogacy agreement would run counter to established law that the
“intended parent” rule only comes into play to
“break the tie” between
two women, each of whom has either donated the ovum or carried the
child. In this case, the intended mother had done neither, and
therefore had no legal claim to the child. It is unclear why the court
did not look to the donor insemination statute, as it did in a similar
case. Although this appeals court chastised the trial court for
deciding against the father because it was displeased with his
behavior, it appears that the appeal was decided equally on situational
particulars (i.e. the surrogate’s desire to withdraw from the
contract).
The California Supreme Court
held in 1993 that, in the absence of explicit guidance from the
legislature on surrogacy, the judiciary should do its best to apply
existing family law. That law asserts a “compelling state
interest in establishing paternity for all children,” but was
promulgated before the possibility of gestational surrogacy and
therefore seems to establish the possibility of double maternity. More
specifically, Family Code § 7610 says that
“the…relationship… [b]etween a child
and the natural mother…may be established by proof of her
having given birth to the child.” This case establishes a
rule for “tie-breaking” in this situation, which
comes down on the side of surrogacy: the woman who intended to be the
mother at the time of the surrogacy agreement should be the one granted
custody.
There is
no provision on surrogacy in Colorado state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Colorado law or reported or published cases dealing with
the issue of surrogacy.
There is
no provision on surrogacy in Connecticut state law, but it appears to
be permitted.
Summary:
While Connecticut law is silent with regard to surrogacy agreements,
courts have addressed cases involving such agreements and upheld their
terms.
Detail: No Connecticut
appellate court has explicitly indicated that surrogacy contracts are
valid, but cases involving such agreements have been adjudicated and
parenting arrangements contemplated by those agreements have been
upheld. Additionally, a state superior court has upheld a surrogacy
agreement.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Doe v. Doe, decided a custody dispute
in 1998 between a husband and wife over a child born to a surrogate
mother through a traditional surrogacy agreement (in which
the surrogate mother is the biological contributor
of the egg). Based on a state statutory presumption that it is in the
best interests of the child to be in the custody of a biological
parent, the Court held that even though the wife was not biologically
related to the child, her role in raising the child was enough to
overcome the presumption. However, the Court explicitly stated that it
was not addressing “whether, or to what extent a surrogate
contract, by which the surrogate obligates herself to surrender the
child to the child’s father and his spouse, is
enforceable.”
The Connecticut Supreme Court
found in the 1998 case of Doe v. Roe, that a trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction to approve an adoption agreement that includes a
surrogate mother’s consent to termination of parental rights.
The surrogate mother had argued that the contract
was void because it was against public policy. Nevertheless, the Court
explicitly stated that it was not deciding the validity of surrogacy
contracts.
In a 2002 case, Vogel v.
McBride, a gay male couple had contracted with a surrogate to deliver
an embryo developed from an egg fertilized by one of the
men’s sperm. The superior court ordered the hospital to place
the names of both men on the birth certificate. The court went on to
state, “The egg donor agreement and the gestational carrier
agreement [were] valid, enforceable, irrevocable and of full legal
effect” under the laws of Connecticut.
There is
no provision on surrogacy in Delaware state law, but it appears to be
prohibited.
Summary:
While Delaware law does not address surrogacy agreements, at least one
court has ruled those agreements are against the public policy of the
state.
Detail: While the
Delaware Supreme Court has not ruled on the legality or enforceability
of surrogacy contracts, a lower court held that a
“contractual agreement to terminate parental rights
… is against the public policy of this [s]tate and may not
be enforced by the [c]ourt.”
One 1988 case did not involve a
surrogacy agreement, but rather concerned an adoptive father who sought
to terminate all parental rights over his wife’s biological
son through a “Property Division Agreement” after a
divorce. The court noted that the Delaware Legislature had not
“provide[d] for termination of parental rights by contractual
agreement of the parents,” and analogized the case to the
well-publicized Baby M surrogacy case in New Jersey. It held that
“the receipt of money in connection with an adoption is
barred by Delaware law,” and termination of parental rights
through contractual agreement is forbidden.
District
of Columbia law prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: District of
Columbia law prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Detail: Under D.C.
law, both traditional (in which the surrogate mother is the biological
contributor of the egg) and gestational (in which the surrogate
mother is not the biological contributor of the egg)
surrogacy agreements are prohibited and unenforceable. Violation of the
statute is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, as much as one year
in jail, or both.
Florida
law permits surrogacy agreements for married couples only.
Summary: Florida law
explicitly allows both gestational (in which the surrogate
mother is not the biological contributor of the egg) and
traditional (in which the surrogate mother is the
biological contributor of the egg) surrogacy agreements, but neither is
available to unmarried same-sex couples.
Detail: The
gestational surrogacy statutes impose strict
requirements on the contracts, among them limiting involvement to
"couple[s that] are legally married and are both 18 years of age or
older." The law governing traditional surrogacy arrangements, referred
to as preplanned adoption agreements, connects those contracts to state
adoption law. Florida law explicitly prohibits
“homosexuals” from
adopting. This law was upheld by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
In one case in 2000, the Florida
Court of Appeals noted that the right to enter into surrogate-parenting
agreements is reserved for married couples only and is one of the many
rights not given to domestic partners. While the ruling concerned only
the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act, Florida courts would
likely interpret other county domestic partnership laws in a similar
way.
There is
no provision on surrogacy in Georgia state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Georgia law or reported or published cases dealing with
the issue of surrogacy.
There is no provision on
surrogacy in Hawaii state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Hawaii law or reported or published cases dealing with
the issue of surrogacy.
There is no provision on
surrogacy in Idaho state law, but it appears to be permitted.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Hawaii law or reported or published cases dealing with
the issue of surrogacy.
Illinois law permits surrogacy
agreements.
Summary: Illinois law
provides for gestational surrogacy (where the surrogate mother
is not biologically related to the child she is carrying), but does not
address traditional surrogacy (in which the surrogate mother
is the biological contributor of the egg).
Detail: According to
Illinois law, a parent and child
relationship may be established voluntarily by consent of the parties
when: (1) the surrogate mother certifies she is not
the biological mother; (2) the husband of the surrogate mother
certifies he is not the biological father; (3) the biological mother
certifies she donated the egg; (4) the biological father certifies he
donated the sperm; and (5) a licensed physician certifies in writing
that all of the above is true.
Indiana law prohibits
surrogacy agreements.
Summary: Indiana law
declares surrogacy contracts unenforceable as against public policy.
Detail: State law
declares surrogacy contracts "void and
unenforceable.” Specifically, the law lists several broad
contractual
terms that, if any is included, void a surrogacy agreement. Such
forbidden terms include requiring the surrogate to provide a gamete (a
mature sexual reproductive cell) to conceive a child, become pregnant
herself or waive her parental rights or duties — provisions
typically
at the heart of any meaningful traditional (in which the surrogate
mother is the biological contributor of the egg) or
gestational (in which the surrogate mother is not
the biological contributor of the egg) surrogacy agreement.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Iowa state law.
Summary: Iowa has no
laws that specifically address the
enforceability of surrogacy contracts. The state law prohibiting the
purchase or sale of an individual specifically states that it does not
apply to surrogate mother arrangements.
There is no provision on
surrogacy in Kansas state law, but it appears to be prohibited.
Summary: Kansas has no
laws regarding surrogacy, but two
attorney general opinions indicate that surrogate parenting agreements
are unenforceable in the state.
Detail: One opinion of
the state attorney general in 1996
addressed whether a surrogate fee would be considered a professional
service governed under the provision of state law which addresses fees
in adoption proceedings. The statute permits reasonable fees for
“legal
and other professional services rendered in connection with the
placement or adoption.” The opinion stated that surrogate
motherhood
does not fit into the definition of “professional
service.” Though this
opinion indicates that a contract providing a fee for bearing a child
for another may be unenforceable, it noted that it is permissible to
provide reasonable living expenses for the mother during pregnancy.
Another opinion in 1982 stated
that a surrogate parent contract would
be void as against public policy. The attorney general noted that the
“commercialization of motherhood” had not been
legitimated by the
Kansas legislature, and that these contracts would be unenforceable
public policy until they receive legislative approval.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Kentucky state law, but it
appears to be permitted.
Summary: There is no
statutory provision in Kentucky
directly addressing the validity of surrogacy agreements, but an
attorney general opinion and case law indicate uncompensated agreements
may be permissible. In addition, anecdotal evidence indicates that some
same-sex couples have successfully parented through surrogacy
arrangements.
Detail: There is no
provision in Kentucky law on the subject
of surrogacy. An attorney general opinion cautions against, at least,
compensated agreements.
In 1980, the attorney general
concluded that “contracts involving
surrogate parenthood are illegal and unenforceable in the
Commonwealth.” He based his opinion on the existence of
statutory
provisions barring the sale of children and requiring voluntary consent
for adoption, as well as “strong public policy against the
buying and
selling of children.” Case law indicates approval for
uncompensated
surrogacy agreements, but it is unclear how precisely a court would
evaluate any surrogacy contract where money is involved. In one 1986
case, the Kentucky attorney general sought to revoke the corporate
charter of an agency that arranged surrogacy contracts. The attorney
general argued that surrogacy contracts arranged by the company
violated Kentucky statutes that barred the sale of a child for purposes
of adoption and that invalidated a mother’s consent to
adoption prior
to the birth of a child. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
fundamental differences between traditional surrogacy contracts (in
which the surrogate mother
is the biological contributor of the egg) and the practices that were
the focus of the baby-selling laws took surrogacy contracts outside the
scope of those laws.
The Court reasoned that surrogacy
arrangements are
made prior to the conception of the child; the prospective birth mother
is thus not concerned about the results of an unwanted pregnancy or the
financial burden of raising a child, but with assisting an infertile
couple. Baby-selling statutes thus differentiated, the court found that
it was not up to the courts to "cut off [procreative] solutions offered
by science." The implication is that the courts would uphold an
uncompensated surrogacy agreement, however no such case has arisen
before the courts.
Louisiana law prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: Louisiana law
holds any traditional surrogacy contract (in which the surrogate
mother
is the biological contributor of the egg) void and unenforceable, but
does not address uncompensated agreements or gestational surrogacy (in
which the surrogate mother is not the biological
contributor of the egg) arrangements.
Detail: Louisiana law
finds traditional surrogacy agreements "contrary to public policy" and
thus “absolutely null.”
There is no provision on
surrogacy in Maine state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Maine law or reported or published cases dealing with the
issue of surrogacy.
Maryland state law is unclear
on surrogacy.
Summary: The
enforceability of surrogacy contracts in
Maryland is unclear. While Maryland does not have a specific law that
addresses surrogacy agreements, related laws may hold compensated
agreements unenforceable.
Detail: Maryland law
bans payment for adoption services and
prohibits the sale or purchase of minors and punishes this act by a
fine and/or jail time. The question as to whether or not these laws
apply to surrogacy agreements is widely contested among politicians and
legal academics in the state. An opinion of the attorney general
indicates disapproval of compensated surrogacy agreements.
In an attempt to settle the
issue, the Legislature has unsuccessfully
tried for the past several years to pass bills regarding surrogacy. One
2000 state attorney general opinion indicates that surrogacy contracts
involving the payment of a fee to the birth mother are generally
illegal and unenforceable based on existing state law. This suggests
that the state would not challenge an uncompensated surrogacy contract.
The opinion also states that the payment of a surrogacy fee could not
by itself bar approval of an adoption petition and the decision to
grant an adoption decision must turn on the best interests of the
child.
Massachusetts law permits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: Massachusetts
is generally favorable to surrogacy agreements.
Detail: State courts
have generally treated surrogacy
contracts favorably. Massachusetts treats traditional surrogacy
agreements, in which a surrogate mother is
artificially
inseminated, differently from gestational surrogacy, in which she has
no genetic relationship to the child but carries an egg from the
intended mother that was fertilized by the intended father. In one case
in 2001, the Supreme Judicial Court granted a joint request from a paid
gestational mother, a genetic mother, and a genetic father to have the
genetic parents listed as the parents on the baby’s birth
certificate.
While this is further indication of the judiciary’s openness
to
surrogacy agreements, the Court did not give a ringing endorsement of
the enterprise. The Court emphasized that current state law did not
address gestational surrogacy agreements, and set forth criteria under
which lower courts may review requests for atypical birth-certificate
assignations in surrogacy cases. Those criteria are: (a) the plaintiffs
are the sole genetic sources; (b) the gestational carrier agrees with
the orders sought; (c) no one, including the hospital, has contested
the complaint or petition; and (d) by filing the complaint and
stipulation for judgment, the plaintiffs agree that they have waived
any contradictory provisions in the contract. The Court also noted that
a factor indicating positive disposition in these cases is that the
gestational mother is related to one of the genetic parents. In one
1998 case, a surrogate mother decided in the sixth
month of her
pregnancy to keep the child. The court found that two elements must
exist to validate a surrogacy agreement: (1) the surrogate
mother's consent to the surrogacy must last until four days
after the birth and (2) the surrogate mother
must receive no compensation. Other conditions might be important in
deciding the enforceability of a surrogacy agreement, among them (a)
that the surrogate mother's husband give his
informed consent to the agreement in advance; (b) that the surrogate
mother is an adult and has had at least one successful
pregnancy; (c) that the surrogate mother,
her husband, and the intended parents have been evaluated for the
soundness of their judgment and for their capacity to carry out the
agreement; (d) the intended mother be incapable of bearing a child
without endangering her health; (e) the intended parents be suitable
persons to assume custody of the child; and (f) all parties have the
advice of counsel.
The Court does emphasize that no
agreement is per se valid: “the mother
and father may not … make a binding
best-interests-of-the-child
determination by private agreement. Any custody agreement is subject to
a judicial determination of custody based on the best interests of the
child.” While all of the other conditions listed above need
not exist
to validate the surrogacy, it is not entirely clear how a judge would
apply them to a gay male couple as intended parents.
Because the best of interests of
the child is the final determination,
however, a judge could certainly find such a couple to be the best
environment for the child of the surrogacy.
Michigan law prohibits compensated surrogacy agreements. Also the
contracts are void and unenforceable.
Summary: Michigan law
strongly prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Detail: Michigan has
one of the strictest laws prohibiting
surrogacy contracts, not only holding them unenforceable, but also
imposing fines and jail time on anyone who enters into such a contract
(up to five years and $50,000 for some). Case law has upheld the
validity of this law. In one case in 1992, several would-be
participants in surrogacy arrangements challenged
the law,
arguing that the state had no compelling interest in prohibiting
surrogacy. The court disagreed and found three compelling interests:
preventing children from becoming commodities, serving the best
interests of children and preventing the exploitation of women. Further
clarifying the surrogacy statute, the court noted that any agreement
involving conception and relinquishment of parental rights by the
surrogate is void. In one 1981 case, individuals involved in
compensated surrogacy agreements challenged the constitutionality of
Michigan statutes barring the exchange of money or other consideration
in connection with adoption and related proceedings. In a very short
opinion, the Court concluded that state regulation of adoption in this
manner does not infringe individuals’ federal constitutional
due
process right to procreation.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Minnesota state law.
Summary: There is no
provision in Minnesota law on the
subject of surrogacy. While the state legislature has considered
surrogacy bills, it has yet to pass one.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Mississippi state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Mississippi law or reported or published cases dealing
with the issue of surrogacy.
Missouri state law is unclear on surrogacy.
Summary: The legal
status of surrogacy agreements in Missouri is unclear.
Detail: Missouri has
no laws directly regarding surrogacy.
However, the crime of “trafficking in children” (a
felony) includes
payment for “delivery or offer of delivery of a child
… for purposes of
adoption, or for the execution of consent to adopt or waiver of consent
to future adoption or consent to termination of parental
rights.” A
compensated surrogacy agreement might run afoul of this law. For a
theory on the legitimacy of gestational surrogacy agreements (in which
the surrogate mother
is not the biological contributor of the egg) under Missouri law, see
Yvonne M. Warlen, Note, The Renting of the Womb: An Analysis of
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts Under Missouri Contract Law, 62 UMKC L.
Rev. 583 (1994)
There is no provision on surrogacy in Montana state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Montana law or reported or published cases dealing with
the issue of surrogacy.
Nebraska law prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: Nebraska law
declares surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable, but may allow
uncompensated agreements.
Detail: Existing state
law defines unenforceable surrogate
contracts as “a contract by which a woman is compensated for
bearing a
child of a man who is not her husband,” thus leaving open the
possibility of uncompensated surrogacy arrangements.
Nebraska
law also explicitly imposes “all the rights and obligations
imposed by
law” upon the biological father party to a surrogacy
agreement. Because
surrogacy contracts usually involve the biological father, this would
leave custody jointly in the hands of the intended father and the
gestational mother.
Nevada law permits surrogacy agreements for married couples only.
Summary: Nevada law
prevents unmarried people from entering surrogacy agreements.
Detail: Existing state
law restricts the adopting parties of
a surrogacy agreement to people “whose marriage is
valid” under Nevada
law. The statute defines “intended parents” as
“a man and a woman,
married to each other.” Given this specific language, it is
unlikely
that a GLBT individual or couple would be permitted to enter into an
enforceable surrogacy agreement.
New
Hampshire Surrogacy Law
New Hampshire law permits surrogacy agreements for married couples
only.
Summary: New Hampshire
law appears to prohibit GLBT individuals and couples from entering into
surrogacy agreements.
Detail: According to
existing state law, “‘Intended
parents,’ including an ‘intended father’
and ‘intended mother,’ means
people who are married to each other, and who enter a surrogacy
contract with a surrogate by which they are to become the parents of
the resulting child.” Given this specific language, it is
unlikely that
a GLBT individual or couple would be permitted to enter into an
enforceable surrogacy agreement.
New Jersey law permits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: New Jersey
permits only uncompensated gestational surrogacy agreements (in which
the surrogate mother is not the biological
contributor of the egg).
Detail: Surrogacy
cases in New Jersey have created a fairly well-defined common law rule
that prohibits traditional surrogacy arrangements
(in which the surrogate mother is the biological
contributor of the egg) and allows only uncompensated gestational surrogacy
arrangements. One case in 2000 addressed the rights of
intended parents in a gestational surrogacy arrangement
in which the surrogate mother
gave birth to a child with no genetic connection to her. The intended
mother's sister agreed to carry the baby, and the intended parents
sought to compel the state attorney general to put their names on the
birth certificate. The court found that the agreement was enforceable
because it did not involve compensation and the surrogate was not
subject to a binding agreement before birth. In gestational surrogacy
arrangements,
the intended parents must wait 72 hours after the birth before the
surrogate can surrender custody. But under New Jersey law, the birth
certificate does not have to be filed for five days. Thus, a two-day
window exists during which intended parents can be placed on the birth
certificate. In perhaps the most famous surrogacy case in the nation,
In Re Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1988 invalidated a
traditional surrogacy agreement, which provided a $10,000 fee to the surrogate
mother.
The Court barred the use of money in an adoption placement and further
held that no one could contractually abandon their parental rights.
New Mexico law permits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: New Mexico
law appears to allow surrogacy agreements, but only if uncompensated.
Detail: New Mexico law
forbids “payment to a woman for
conceiving and carrying a child” but allows payment for
medical and
other similar expenses incurred “by a mother or the
adoptee.”
New York
Surrogacy Law
New York law prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: New York law
holds surrogacy agreements void and unenforceable.
Detail: Under New York
law, surrogacy contracts are contrary
to public policy. Case law also reflects that position. However, at
least one court has recognized the rights of intended parents in an
assisted reproduction situation absent a contract. In one 1994 divorce
proceeding, a husband sought sole custody of the two children of the
marriage on the basis that his wife was their gestational, but not
genetic, mother. The wife had undergone an in vitro fertilization
procedure in which she was impregnated with an anonymous donor egg
fertilized with her husband’s sperm. The Court followed the
analysis of
the California Supreme Court in a similar case, Johnson v. Calvert (see
California entry for summary). Accordingly, the Court found the
gestational mother to be the legal mother of the children, based on the
intent of the parties regarding parentage. The Court did not mention or
consider the statutory ban on surrogacy in this case. In one case in
1990, decided before the statutory ban on surrogacy agreements was
passed, a married couple had entered into an extensive contract with a
surrogate, including a $10,000 “surrogate fee.” The
Court found the
surrogate’s commitment to relinquish the child she carried
could not be
truly voluntary because of the financial inducement. While the Court
went on to find that its conclusion might be altered by a sworn
statement by the surrogate that the child’s best interests
lie with the
contracting couple, this option is probably foreclosed by the
subsequent passage of the law voiding surrogacy agreements.
North
Carolina Surrogacy Law
There is no provision on surrogacy in North Carolina state law, but it
appears to be permitted.
Summary: North
Carolina has no laws directly regarding
surrogacy. However, other laws appear to allow surrogacy arrangements
that do not include payment beyond the surrogate’s medical
and related
expenses.
Detail: State adoption
law generally forbids compensation
for consent to adopt or relinquishment of parental rights. However, the
law provides for exceptions to this rule, among them payment for a
mother’s medical and related expenses during pregnancy, and
allows that
payment to be contingent on the relinquishment for adoption.
North Dakota law prohibits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: North Dakota
law holds surrogacy contracts to be void and unenforceable.
Detail: According to
existing state law, any surrogate agreement is void. The surrogate
mother
is deemed the legal mother of any child born as a result of a
surrogacy, and her husband, if there is one, is considered the legal
father.
Ohio
Surrogacy Law
Ohio state law is unclear on surrogacy.
Summary: Ohio law does
not address the validity of surrogacy
agreements, but their mention in other statutes indicates some degree
of legislative acceptance.
Detail: Ohio laws
regarding artificial insemination “do not
deal … with surrogate motherhood.” Ohio case law
on surrogacy is
unsettled. Ohio courts have addressed surrogacy arrangements several
times, but the state Supreme Court has never definitively ruled whether
surrogate-parenting contracts are enforceable. One 2001 case involved a
man who entered into an oral agreement with his sister to carry a child
for him and his same-sex partner. The sister was inseminated by an
anonymous donor, but during the pregnancy began to have doubts about
the arrangement. The court determined that the surrogate was the legal
mother of the child for the following reasons: the child’s
lack of
biological connection to the male couple, the lack of a written
agreement and lack of certification of the verbal agreement by a family
agency or court, and the fact that biological parents may be denied
custody only in the case of abandonment, valid contractual
relinquishment of custody, or total inability to provide care or
support. The court ruled explicitly that even if a determination is
made that a biological parent has forfeited his or her rights or that
his or her custody would be detrimental to the child, the burden is
still on the party seeking parental rights to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that granting custody to the biological parent would
still be unsuitable.
The court found it possible
“for a parent to contractually relinquish
their rights to custody and still reacquire custody based on the
non-parent's inability to show parental unsuitability." Nowhere in the
decision did the court discuss the adoptive parents' sexual orientation
as an issue in the decision. In fact, the judge's opinion outlines how
the brother's partner might have gone about adopting the child had the
surrogacy arrangement been legitimate. Thus, it seems the potential for
same-sex couples in Ohio to use surrogacy arrangements exists, provided
the contracts are entered into legally. Contributing some of the
genetic material would also probably strengthen a case brought for
custody for the intended parents. In another case, the Ohio Court of
Appeals held in 1999 that genetic testing of a child conceived through
a traditional surrogacy arrangement (in which the surrogate
mother
is the biological contributor of the egg) was required to identify the
child’s father. Two couples had created a written agreement
under which
the wife of one couple was to be inseminated by the husband of the
other couple and relinquish custody of the child to the biological
father and his wife after the birth. The surrogate mother
reneged on the agreement, and invoked O.R.C. Ann. 3111.37, a statute
establishing that a child born from artificial insemination to a
married woman is the natural child of her husband.
The court held that the statute
contemplated a procedure performed by a
physician utilizing an anonymous sperm donor and did not apply in this
case. Nevertheless, the court found genetic testing to determine
paternity was in the best interest of the child in this case and
referred the determination of parentage (after such testing) back to
the lower court. In 1994, a lower court held that the intended parents
in a gestational surrogacy agreement (in which the surrogate
mother
is not the biological contributor of the egg) were the natural and
legal parents of the resulting child. However, the court noted that
“as
a matter of public policy, the state will not enforce or encourage
private agreements or contracts to give up parental rights.”
Because
the decision came from a trial court, the language is not binding on
other courts and may relate only to compensated agreements. After a
complicated custody battle, in 1992 the Court of Appeals eventually
denied custody to the intended mother in a traditional surrogacy
agreement because she had no biological tie to the child, nor any
recognizable legal tie because the surrogacy contract was an oral
agreement and thus unenforceable. The court did not discuss how it
would have ruled on a written contract, but concluded that the legality
of surrogacy agreements in Ohio is "unsettled and open to considerable
scrutiny."
Oklahoma
Surrogacy Law
There is no provision on surrogacy in Oklahoma state law, but it
appears to permitted.
Summary: Oklahoma has
no laws directly addressing surrogacy,
but an attorney general opinion indicated that surrogacy agreements run
afoul of state law against “trafficking in
children.” However, a
surrogate parenting agreement that only provides compensation for
medical and other basic expenses may be permitted.
Detail: The state
Attorney General concluded that surrogate
parenting contracts that provide compensation to affect the adoption of
a child violates state law prohibiting trafficking in children, which
includes the “acceptance, offer or payment of compensation in
connection with the transfer of legal or physical custody or adoption
of a minor child.” State adoption law permits the payment of
reasonable
medical expenses for the birth mother and minor to be adopted, and it
is possible that such reimbursement would be acceptable in the
surrogacy context without violating the child trafficking law.
Oregon
Surrogacy Law
Oregon law permits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: Oregon law
appears to allow only uncompensated surrogacy arrangements.
Detail: The statute
prohibiting “buying or selling a person”
has an explicit exemption for “fees for services in an
adoption
pursuant to a surrogacy agreement.” This appears to codify
the
conclusion of a 1989 opinion issued by the attorney general, which
indicated that the state may invalidate any agreement in which money is
exchanged for the right to adopt a child, particularly when the birth
mother contests it. The case law confirms that if a surrogate
mother
is compensated for her consent to adoption under a surrogacy contract,
the contract is unenforceable. However, it appears that a surrogacy
arrangement in which the compensated surrogate mother
would
have carried the baby with or without pay would be upheld. In one case
in 1994, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld an uncontested surrogacy
arrangement, refusing to invalidate the agreement even though payment
to the surrogate mother exceeded her
pregnancy-related
expenses. The Court emphasized that the facts indicated the surrogate
would have entered into the agreement even without compensation and
that she was not seeking to withdraw her consent for the adoption of
the child. However, this case was decided before the statutory
provision discussed above was passed by the legislature.
Pennsylvania state law is unclear on surrogacy.
Summary: The case law
regarding surrogacy is ambiguous in
Pennsylvania. It appears that a compensated surrogacy agreement would
be held unenforceable. However, an arrangement established through a
legally recognized agency appears to be legal. The validity of informal
arrangements is less certain.
Detail: One case in
1997 did not involve a surrogacy
contract, but rather a paternity dispute (apparently between a current
husband and an extramarital male sexual partner) and the allocation of
parental support duties. The court observed that the husband attempted
to make a deal with the other man to obtain property in exchange for
continued support of the child. In condemning this action as
“odious
and demeaning to the nature of child care and
responsibility,” the
court referenced a New Jersey case, In Re Baby M., which held
compensated surrogacy contracts invalid under that state’s
laws. The
court concluded, “[w]e do not tolerate purchasing children
for adoption
and the bargaining over parenting rights and duties … in
exchange for
financial consideration is reprehensible. Any agreement reached thereby
would have been unenforceable.” Another 1997 case, Huddleston
v.
Infertility Center of America, involved a negligence action brought
against a fertility clinic and did not directly relate to the validity
of surrogacy arrangements. However, implicit in the decision was that
state law permitted surrogacy arrangements through this particular
agency.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Rhode Island state law, but it
appears to be permitted.
Summary: Rhode Island
has no laws regarding surrogacy
directly, but there appears to be some legislative approval for at
least some forms of surrogacy.
Detail: The state law
prohibition on cloning has an
explicit exception for the assisted reproductive technologies used in
gestational surrogacy (in which the surrogate mother
is not the biological contributor of the egg).
South
Carolina Surrogacy Law
South Carolina state law is unclear on surrogacy.
Summary: There are no
existing provisions in South Carolina
law regarding surrogacy. The limited case law indicates an acceptance
of surrogacy contracts, although it only addresses those involving
married, heterosexual couples.
Detail: One 2003 case
before a federal district court did
not deal directly with the validity of a surrogacy agreement, but
rather the status of the child of that agreement with regard to an
insurance policy. The husband of the surrogate sought coverage for the
child of the surrogacy under his insurance policy’s coverage
of a
“natural child.” The court gave great deference to
the terms of the
surrogacy contract and the stipulations by the parties therein
regarding the legal status of the adults and child involved. (The court
found that the child of the surrogacy was not the “natural
child” of
the surrogate’s husband, based largely on statements to that
effect in
the surrogacy contract.) While the court’s holding does not
go to the
legitimacy of surrogacy arrangements in South Carolina directly, the
court clearly assumed that such an arrangement was not contrary to
state law when it showed such deference to its terms.
There is no provision on surrogacy in South Dakota state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in South Dakota law or reported or published cases dealing
with the issue of surrogacy
Tennessee law permits surrogacy agreements for married couples only.
Summary: Tennessee law
appears to give surrogacy contracts
legal consequence, but claims neither to approve nor forbid them.
However, state law defines a “surrogate birth” to
occur only when the
surrogate is gestating a fetus for a married couple.
Detail: State law
defines “surrogate birth” as either an
arrangement by which a surrogate agrees to carry the embryo of two
married people or by which she agrees to carry a child to be parented
by a married couple. The law also indicates that if such an agreement
is in place, there is no need for a formal adoption proceeding. The
state court system also seems disposed to granting force to
reproductive agreements. In one 1992 case, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that “in disputes as to embryos, any prior agreement
would be
honored.” This decision did not specifically address
surrogacy, but the
Court’s willingness to adjudicate a case involving embryos
intended for
surrogacy suggests a judiciary approval of such contracts in Tennessee.
Texas law permits surrogacy agreements for married couples only.
Summary: Texas law
explicitly allows but heavily regulates surrogacy agreements, and it
appears to exclude same-sex couples.
Detail: Among other
constraints, existing state law requires
intended parents to be married to each other. A court must validate a
surrogacy contract for parental rights to attach to the intended
parents upon birth of the child; a contract not validated by the court
is unenforceable.
Utah
Surrogacy Law
Utah permits Gestational Surrogacy for married couples.
Summary: Utah permits
Gestational Surrogacy for married couples.
Detail: Governor Jon
Huntsman has signed into law a
surrogacy law that permits court-approved contracts and sets out
procedures for obtaining birth certificates for children born to
gestational carriers. The law is limited in its application to married
infertile couples and carriers who are not using their own eggs. Prior
to this, Utah law prohibited any form of surrogacy and any traditional
surrogate or gestational carrier, regardless of whether she was a
genetic parent, was required to go on the child's initial birth
certificate. Despite some opposition in the House of Representatives,
the law passed and goes into effect July 1, 2005. Utah Uniform
Parentage Act, 2005 General Session, Utah Code Annotated 78-45g-801.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Vermont state law, but it appears
to be permitted.
Summary: Surrogacy
agreements are likely available to GLBT individuals and couples in
Vermont, but this is not entirely clear.
Detail: There is no
case law dealing directly with
surrogacy, but at least one case has indicated an acceptance of such
agreements in Vermont. In the groundbreaking 1999 case that led to the
creation of civil unions in Vermont, the state itself argued that
restricting marriage to different-sex couples would serve the important
goal of minimizing complications in surrogacy agreements, suggesting a
basic acceptance of such agreements. The Court’s holding
granting the
state-level benefits and responsibilities of marriage to same-sex
couples likely includes that acceptance of surrogacy.
Virginia law permits surrogacy agreements for married couples only.
Summary: Virginia law
explicitly approves of uncompensated
surrogacy, but it appears to exclude same-sex couples from
participation in these arrangements.
Detail: Virginia
statutes impose numerous restrictions on
surrogacy contracts, including limiting formation of such agreements to
a surrogate and "intended parents" defined as "a man and a woman,
married to each other."
Washington law permits surrogacy agreements.
Summary: Washington
allows uncompensated surrogacy
arrangements but deems illegal and unenforceable any agreement
involving any payment to the surrogate mother other
than medical and legal expenses.
Detail: State law
specifies that compensated surrogacy
arrangements are void and unenforceable as against public policy, and
is punishable as a gross misdemeanor. A custody dispute between the surrogate
mother
and the intended parents is resolved according to a multi-pronged
balancing test codified in Washington law, largely based upon the
child’s relationship with each parent. A parent-child
relationship can
be established by a valid surrogate parentage contract or an affidavit
and physician’s certificate wherein an egg donor or
gestational
surrogate sets forth her intent to be the legal parent of the child. A
1989 opinion from the attorney general confirmed this assessment of
state law, and also indicated that a surrogate parenting agreement is
not enforceable if the surrogate withdraws her consent to relinquish
her child before court approval of the consent.
There is no provision on surrogacy in West Virginia state law, but it
appears to be permitted.
Summary: West Virginia
has no laws directly addressing the legality of surrogacy contracts.
Detail: State law
prohibiting the purchase or sale of a
child specifically mentions that “fees and expenses included
in any
agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate mother”
are not prohibited by the statute, suggesting that surrogacy
arrangements may be enforceable.
Wisconsin state law is unclear on surrogacy.
Summary: Wisconsin law
does not directly address the legality of surrogacy contracts.
Detail: In the statute
pertaining to the collection of vital statistics, the law states that
the surrogate mother’s
name is to be added to the birth certificate until “a court
determines
parental rights,” at which time a new birth certificate with
names of
the intended parents may be issued, but the statute does not lay out
the factors a court should consider in making that decision.
There is no provision on surrogacy in Wyoming state law.
Summary: There are no
provisions in Wyoming law or reported or published cases dealing with
the issue of surrogacy.
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